US Policy Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa
Recognizing the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa in US strategic policy is not new. For almost two decades, scholars have noted the importance of a robust US policy for monitoring and shaping the conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1992, Africa scholar Dr. K. P. Magyar characterized the African continent as a "conflict environment" 11 where the causes of conflict are inefficient economic and political structures, 12 friction between Arab-African and Black African cultures, 13 and influence asserted by states from outside the region. 14 Dr. Magyar suggested that close monitoring and analysis of events on the African continent were imperative. 15 In 1995,
Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1987, observed that instability in Africa had implications for US interests and argued that the interplay between Africa's demographic, climactic, geological, and conflict trends required serious monitoring and engagement by the US. 16 In 1997, Dr. Dan Henk observed that there are overlapping US national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, including regional stability, denial of sponsorship or safe havens for extremists, and promoting good governance and economic development. 17 Undoubtedly, the war on terrorism brought the strategic importance of the African continent to the fore such that US interests in Africa are explicitly addressed in post 9/11 security strategies.
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (2002 NSS) recognized
the instability in Africa created by poverty, armed conflict, and disease. 18 The 2002 NSS identified the link between fragile states and potential safe havens for extremist organizations that threaten US security interests 19 and identified three interlocking strategies for the region. 20 First, countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and will receive focused attention. Second, the US will work with its European allies and international institutions to implement constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations. Third, Africa's capable reforming states and intergovernmental organizations with a commitment to good governance and democratic political systems must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis. 21 The • Providing security assistance programs that are critical to securing the objective of a peaceful African continent, working with our African partners to build capacity at three levels: (1) at the level of the African Union, (2) at the sub-regional level with the Regional Economic Communities, and (3) at the level of individual states.
• Promoting democratic systems and practices.
•Promoting sustainable, market-led economic growth.
• Promoting health and social development.
To achieve our security objectives, the US must strengthen partnerships in SubSaharan Africa, and through those partnerships, apply military and non-military power when and where needed to promote stability and to defeat adversaries when required.
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, the initial focus should be on Phase Zero shaping activities and expanding partnerships with intergovernmental organizations.
Intergovernmental Organizations
An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is an organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments to protect and promote interests shared by member states. 38 The activities of IGOs are consistent with traditional practices that promote international cooperation and stem from diplomacy, rules of war, and international law. 39 While states are the members of an IGO, states do not necessarily dictate the behavior of the organization since IGOs tend to exercise power autonomously and establish their own agendas, rules, and norms. 40 States often 6 join an IGO not because they believe they can dominate the agenda of the IGO, but because of the leverage the organization has in developing and implementing policies which will benefit the states versus what the states can achieve with traditional diplomacy. 41 Current US policy recognizes the requirement to work multilaterally through regional and sub-regional IGOs. 42 At least one scholar-practitioner has opined that supporting sub-regional IGOs offers a greater return on investment. 43 Chambas, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, described the role of ECOWAS as being an integration facilitator in fighting poverty, promoting good governance and peace, and integrating a common West African space into the global economy. 54 Using its economic, political, and military capabilities, ECOWAS's strategy for the next ten years is two-pronged. First, ensure stability in the sub-region by resolving intra-state and interstate conflicts employing options ranging from mediation and diplomacy to armed intervention. Second, promote economic development. These objectives are complementary in that conflict inhibits economic progress, and economic progress mitigates conflict.
Economic Activities. West African nations have high rates of poverty. 55 Of the 26 countries designated as having "low human development" in the 2008 United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI), twelve are in West Africa. 56 Poverty is a non-military threat to peace and security. 57 The overarching objective of ECOWAS is economic growth and development through integration programs that will mitigate subregional poverty. 58 While the African Union and the ASF provide a pan-African stability operations capability, ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organization, has a greater stake in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in West Africa since the African Union is 13 fundamentally an umbrella organization that relies on contributions from the subregional organizations. 75 The African Union can augment a sub-regional force, but the ESF will be in the lead regarding conflict prevention and resolution in West Africa.
Partnering With ECOWAS
Partnering with African nations is part of the US's overall Africa policy. 76 The 2006 NSS states that the US will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal, including working with intergovernmental organizations such as ECOWAS and nongovernmental organizations. 77 The 2008 National Defense Strategy (2008 NDS) notes that the US will continue to work with allies and international organizations to achieve our objectives. 78 Joint Operation Planning Process considerations include synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) activities with other government agencies, IGOs, multinational forces, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort for accomplishing our objectives. 79 As can be seen, our primary policy and planning documents spell out the requirement for partnering not only with allies, but also with IGOs to accomplish mutual goals and objectives.
Simply declaring the desire to partner with ECOWAS and moving forward with activities in a haphazard manner will not produce the desired results. Partnering with ECOWAS requires a strategy. Professor Art Lykke's strategy model with its ends, ways, and means provides a good framework for analyzing the method for developing a productive partnership with ECOWAS. 80 Common Objectives. The vision of a strategic partnership in Africa has been described as a partnership of equals contributing to common objectives. 81 While 14 integration of the West African states is not one of the explicit US objectives, the objectives of the US and ECOWAS are common inasmuch as the integration objective is part and parcel of the economic development and democratic governance goals that the US sees as key for the sub-region. The US's objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa, working in partnership with Africans, are: maintaining peace with security assistance;
promoting democratic systems and practices; promoting sustainable, broad-based, market-led economic growth; and expanding health and social development. 82 ECOWAS's key objectives are promoting economic development, supporting peace and security, and supporting good governance and democratic principles. 83 Consequently, the economic development, peace and security, and good governance objectives (the desired ends) of the US and ECOWAS are common objectives. 84 The task is fashioning the ways and means to reach the common objectives. 
Promoting Economic

Conclusions and Recommendations
While the US has coined the terms "interagency approach" and "whole-ofgovernment" to describe the cooperative approach to employing all assets from various elements of the government to accomplish objectives, the ECOWAS institutions have a similar structure which operate on political, economic, and military lines of effort.
AFRICOM with its interagency approach to staffing, planning, and execution is well- We must maintain a balanced approach, not only among the ways, ends, and means generally, but also with respect to the political, military, and economic elements of national power employed. Likewise, we must keep the partnership balanced such that we are engaging in cooperative engagement rather than unilateral action. We must set realistic, long-term goals taking into account the current capacities of our partners.
Any lack of balance increases the risk of delay or even failure in reaching the common objectives of the US and ECOWAS.
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Partnering with an IGO like ECOWAS is neither a substitute for bi-lateral diplomatic and commercial relations between the US and African nations, nor multilateral activities with our allies to promote democracy and maintain stability in the region. Partnering with IGOs is a complement to these traditional bilateral and multilateral activities. IGOs are representative bodies which allow broad-based communications and interaction. Obtaining the endorsement of ECOWAS regarding activities which support mutually beneficial goals and objectives will accelerate cooperation with other IGOs. This, in turn, should accelerate the engagement process between the US and its agencies with African governments.
Suggestions for Future Research
Future research is appropriate regarding the structures, key activities and programs, objectives, and capabilities of the IGOs representing the member states of the other Regional Economic Communities in Africa. The strategy for partnering with ECOWAS will not necessarily apply to partnering with the other sub-regional IGOs.
Since the Regional Economic Communities are the building blocks for an integrated African Union, research should also be done on a strategy for partnering with the African Union as the pan-African IGO. 4 Failing and failed are a concern for the US as state collapse is usually accompanied by prolonged, civil violence often spills over into neighboring countries, and failing and failed states can provide sanctuary to criminal and terrorist organizations. Ibid. The 2008 National Defense Strategy recognizes that US security "is tightly bound up with the security of the broader international system," and states that US strategy must "build the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression." Robert M. Gates, National Defense Strategy
